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a b s t r a c t
This study uses a spatial bio-economic modelling framework to estimate the impact of the 2012 weather
extreme in the USA on food security in the developing world. The study also quantiﬁes the potential
effects of a similar weather extreme occurring in 2050 under climate change. The study results indicate
that weather extremes that affect maize productivity in key grain baskets can negatively affect food
security in vulnerable countries. The 2012 weather extreme which occurred in the USA reduced US and
global maize production by 29% compared to trend; maize consumption in the country decreased by 5%
only and this resulted in less surplus maize for exports from the largest maize exporter in the world.
Global maize production decreased by 6% compared to trend. The decrease in global maize production
coupled with a reduction in the volume of global maize exports worsened food insecurity in eastern
Africa, the Caribbean and Central America and India. The effects of the weather extreme on global food
security would be worse, if the latter were to occur under climate change in 2050, assuming no climate
change adaptation worldwide over the years. In addition, the hardest-hit regions would remain the
same, whether the weather extreme occurs in 2012 instead of 2050: Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), South
Asia and the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region. However, sustained growth in per capita income
across world economies between 2000 and 2050 would allow few countries in SSA and the LAC region to
virtually eliminate hunger within their borders. In these countries, per capita income would be high
enough by 2050 to completely offset the negative effect of the weather extreme. The study results are
also consistent with USDA's estimates on US and global maize production and consumption in 2012 after
the weather extreme. Some discrepancy is found on the volume of global maize trade; this implies that
the bio-economic model likely overestimates the effect of the weather extreme on food insecurity.
However, the trends from the analysis are likely to be valid. Further research would involve using a CGE
model that can capture the net effects of weather extremes.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
1. Introduction
The world food system is more vulnerable to weather extremes
for various reasons, the key one being that crop yield changes have
not been keeping up with rising food demand worldwide (Ortiz
et al., 2008; Boyer et al., 2013). Yield growth rates have collapsed
or are stagnating in about 30%, 38% and 39% of global harvested
area for maize, rice and wheat, respectively (Ray et al., 2012). In
addition, wheat yield gains across the developing world have
remained below population growth in recent years (Ortiz et al.,
2008). Other factors that make the global food system more
vulnerable to weather extremes include the globalization of grain
markets and rising fuel prices which increase food transportation
costs (Brown and Funk, 2008).
The globalization of grain markets implies that weather
extremes that reduce food harvests in key breadbaskets inﬂuence
world food prices and can have negative effects on food security in
poor net maize-importing countries (Chung et al., submitted for
publication). However, there is no empirical study on the subject.
Most studies that aim to estimate the socio-economic impact of
climate extremes use statistical approaches to quantify the direct
economic losses brought by climate extremes (Pielke and Landsea,
1998; Changnon, 2003a; Hallegatte, 2007; Pielke, 2007). Such
direct losses usually consist of estimated ﬁnancial losses (e.g.
property or crop losses) closely linked to the climate extreme
(Changnon, 2003a; Changnon, 2003b; Hallegatte, 2007; Hallegatte
et al., 2007). Other studies have attempted to quantify the effect of
climate extremes on human mortality (Kunkel et al., 1999;
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Deschenes and Moretti, 2007). Studies that have estimated the
primary and secondary effects of climate extremes used process-
based models to analyse the impact of extreme weather events on
poverty vulnerability in developing countries (Adger, 1999; Ahmed
et al., 2009), producer and consumer welfare in Spain (Mechler
et al., 2010), and food security in China (Nelson et al., 2010). Unlike
statistical models, process-based models have the ability to con-
sider trade effects in the socio-economic analysis of climate
extremes.
Mechler et al. (2010) used a process-based model, to quantify
the economic effect of a combined heat wave and drought in
Spain. Similarly, Nelson et al. (2010) used a process-based model to
estimate the impact of an extended drought in China on food
security in the nation. These two studies highlighted the need to
consider trade effects in the economic analysis of extreme events.
Since the USA is the leading maize producer and exporter globally,
it is very likely that the extreme weather event of 2012 in the USA
would have indirect secondary effects on food security in other
parts of the world where maize is a staple food.
This study assesses the impact of the 2012 weather extreme in
the USA on food security across the developing world. The study
also estimates the plausible effects on food security of a similar
weather extreme occurring in 2050.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Methodological framework: spatial bio-economic modelling
A spatial bio-economic framework which is described in Nelson
et al. (2010) and illustrated in Fig. 1 was used to estimate the
global impact of the climate extreme occurring in the USA. Crop
and spatial modelling were combined to estimate the biophysical
impact of the climate extreme on maize yields in the USA under
various climate models. The analysis involves a high performance
computing cluster where the Geographic Resources Analysis Sup-
port System (GRASS, http://grass.osgeo.org/) is used to handle
spatial data deﬁned and the Decision Support System for Agro-
technology Transfer (DSSAT) (Hoogenboom et al., 1999; Jones
et al., 2003) was used to simulate crop yield and other biophysical
variables. The biophysical results were deﬁned at the 50 spatial
resolution were averaged to the level of Food Production Units
(FPUs), which are production zones deﬁned within countries
(Rosegrant and et al., 2012). These results were then inputted into
the International Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Com-
modities and Trade (IMPACT) to derive socio-economic results.
IMPACT is a multi-market, multi-country model that focuses on
the agricultural sector and projects trends in national and global
food security under alternative scenarios on population growth,
income growth and future climates (Rosegrant et al., 2008;
Rosegrant and et al., 2012).
2.2. Incorporation of biophysical results into IMPACT
Chung et al. (submitted for publication) used geo-spatial crop
modelling at the 50 spatial resolution to estimate the impact of the
weather extreme on maize yields across the USA. The biophysical
results were then aggregated to the levels of Food Production
Units and inputted into IMPACT. More speciﬁcally, the biophysical
maize yield change brought by the extreme weather event is used
as maize area change (represented as “al” in eq. 1) for irrigated and
rainfed maize in the USA. For example, the biophysical analysis by
Chung et al. (submitted for publication) implies a reduction of 46%
in rainfed maize produced in Ohio. This loss which is represented
by “al” in Eq. (1) is inputted as maize area loss in 2012 due to the
weather extreme in IMPACT. After 2012, the maize area in the USA
is brought back to trend by re-adjusting area growth rates. More
speciﬁcally, the area growth rate is adjusted as follows in 2012:
ar¼ area recovery rate¼ 1
1þal ð1Þ
Since IMPACT involves a partial equilibrium economic model,
simulated per capita income would not change from one socio-
economic scenario to the next. In reality, the weather extreme, by
reducing maize production in the USA, would affect the wages of
maize farmers and other agents involved in the maize value chain
in the USA. In turn, agricultural GDP and hence national income
within the USA would be affected. Since the USA is a major maize
producer and exporter across the world, the climate extreme
would most likely affect wages in other countries. The effect of
the climate extreme onwages would ultimately affect the ability of
households at cushioning themselves against increased food
insecurity. A multi-country Computable General Equilibrium
(CGE) model would be able to capture the effect of the climate
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the bio-economic modelling framework; sources consist of authors and adaptation from (Rosegrant et al., 2008).
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extreme on GDP across world countries, as agricultural and non-
agricultural income are endogenous variables in CGE models.
IMPACT, a multi-market, multi-country partial equilibrium which
focuses on the agricultural sector, estimates the impact of the
climate extreme on food availability per capita without assessing
the secondary effects of the climate extreme on wages and hence
on the ability of households to cushion themselves against
increased food insecurity.
IMPACT is well calibrated for baseline food production and
consumption across the world: simulated annual production and
consumption of selected commodities from IMPACT is similar to
FAO's averaged annual production between 1999 and 2001 (Fig. 2).
2.3. Weather extreme scenarios
Six scenarios are analysed in this study. They all involve one
socio-economic scenario (Base) which consists of moderate
growth in population and world economies between 2000 and
2050. Agricultural technologies are assumed to remain unchanged
over the years, although yield improvements from enhanced
agronomic practices are considered in the model. Consumers'
diets are assumed to change with income growth and higher
income is associated with increased consumption of animal-
sourced foods.
In the ﬁrst scenario (Base-2012), the emission of greenhouse
gases stops in 2000 such that the projected climate around 2050 is
identical to the baseline climate (1950–2000). In the second
scenario (Base-2012-EW), the climate extreme occurs in 2012
under the baseline climate (Table 1).
The three other scenarios relate to the 2050s (Table 1). The
third scenario (Base-2050) projects the world food system in 2050,
under the baseline climate scenario and the base socio-economic
scenario. In the fourth and ﬁfth scenarios, namely ‘CSI2050-B1-
EW’ and ‘MIR2050-A1-EW’, the weather extreme occurs in the
USA in 2050 under the CSIRO and MIROC GCMs, respectively.
Previous analysis has shown that the combination of the CSIRO-
Mk3.0 climate model for 2050 and the B1 emission scenario leads
to the mildest changes in the key variables affecting crop growth,
namely precipitation and temperature, compared to the baseline
climate (Nelson et al., 2010). Similarly, the combination of the
MIROC 3.2 climate model with the A1B emission scenario around
2050 leads to the largest changes in mean precipitation and
temperature compared to the baseline climate (Nelson et al.,
2010). Hence, the range of maize yields in the USA when the
weather extreme occurs under climate change and the yield range
of other crops on a global scale should all be encompassed by the
yields generated under the ‘CSI2050-B1-EW’ and ‘MIR2050-A1-
EW’ scenarios.
3. Results: impact of the weather extreme on food security
3.1. Impact of the 2012 weather extreme on food security across
developing world
Under the ‘Base-2012’ scenario, maize production in the USA
would reach 334 million metric tons in 2012. However, the
extreme weather event consisting of combined heat wave and
drought would decrease maize production in the USA by 29%
compared to the ‘Base-2012’ scenario. On the other hand, maize
consumption in the USA, which would have stood at 244 million
metric tons under the ‘Base-2012’ scenario, would decrease by 5%
only due to the weather extreme. Among all maize uses, the
consumption of maize as animal feed would experience the largest
decrease. The decrease in total maize consumption would be half
of that of total maize production in volume terms and this implies
that the country will have to reduce its net maize exports to meet
its demand requirements. More speciﬁcally, net maize exports in
the USA would decrease by 83 million tons under the ‘Base-2012-
EW’ scenario compared to the ‘Base-2012’ scenario (Fig. 3).
The decrease in maize production in the USA due to the
weather extreme would act as a negative supply shock across
world maize markets. Hence, world maize prices would increase to
reﬂect increased maize scarcity on a global scale. The increased
world maize prices would make maize production attractive in
other regions not affected by the extreme weather event: they
would increase their maize production (Table 2). Across the
developing world, E & SE Asia and the LAC region would lead
the increase in maize production in volume terms (Table 2).
However, the increased maize production in other regions of the
world would not be enough to compensate the decrease in maize
production in the USA. Hence, global maize production would fall
by about 48 million tons compared to the ‘Base-2012’ scenario;
this drop would represent about 6% of global maize production
under the ‘Base-2012’; scenario. The projected increase in maize
production in areas not affected by the weather extreme (Table 2)
is likely to be overstated. Some large maize-producing countries,
including China, plant maize around the same time as the USA.
These countries would not be able to adjust their maize produc-
tion the year when the weather extreme hits the USA.
The decrease in global maize production would affect maize
trade across the globe. All regions across the developing world
would reduce their net maize imports. South Asia and the LAC
Fig. 2. Validation of IMPACT – simulated versus observed world production/
consumption values for selected commodities.
Table 1
Bio-economic scenarios involving a weather extreme.
Scenario name Socio-economic
scenario
Climate
model
Emission
scenario
Weather extreme
(yes/no)
Scenarios for 2012
Base-2012 Base Baseline None No
Base-2012-WE Base Baseline None Yes
Scenarios for 2050
Base-2050 Base Baseline None No
CSI2050-
B1-EW
Base CSIRO-
Mk3.0
B1 Yes
MIR2050-
A1-EW
Base MIROC 3.2 A1 Yes
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Fig. 3. Projected impact of extreme weather event on maize production consumption and net exports for the USA – results from IMPACT.
Table 2
projected impact of the weather extreme on global maize production and net maize trade – results from IMPACT.
Production change in million tonnes (%) Change in net exports in million tonnes (%)
Region Base-2012-EW vs Base-
2012
CSI2050-B1-EW vs Base-
2050
MIR2050-A1-EW vs Base-
2050
Base-2012-EW vs
Base-2012
CSI2050-B1-EW vs
Base-2050
MIR2050-A1-EW vs
Base-2050
SSA 4.5 (11) 8.4 (13) 21.1 (32) 9.3 (−94) 23.5 (−47) 51.2 (−102)
CWANA 1.4 (7) −2.9 (−8) −5.5 (−16) 2.9 (−18) 1.8 (−5) 4.2 (−10)
South Asia 2.1 (11) 2.2 (5) 11.2 (25) 3.6 (−151) 10.4 (−36) 28.0 (−96)
E & SE Asia 15.4 (8) 18.0 (6) 48.3 (16) 32.9 (−58) 64.1 (−63) 139.9 (−138)
LAC 13.5 (13) 33.6 (16) 42.1 (20) 19.7 (−167) 49.1 (253) 73.3 (377)
USA −95.4 (−29) −201.1 (−37) −407.8 (−76) −83.8 (−92) −178.7 (−103) −362.2 (−208)
ROW 10.4 (11) 21.2 (16) 48.1 (37) 15.4 (288) 29.8 (108) 65.6 (238)
World −48.1 (−6) −120.7 (−9) −242.5 (−18) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0)
Major net maize exporters in world (million tonnes)
Country Base-2012 Base-2012-EW Country Base-2050 CSI2050-B1-EW MIR2050-A1-EW
United
States
91.6 7.8 United Statesc 174.0 −4.7 −188.2
Argentina 10.3 13.5 Argentina 20.9 30.7 37.1
Ctr. Eur.d 8.1 11.6 Brazil 19.5 48.6 57.8
Francea 6.0 8.1 Ctr. Eur.d 11.7 19.0 22.7
Ukrainea 4.7 5.6 Ukrainea 11.7 13.7 14.8
Brazila −4.4 5.3 Russiaa 8.4 9.9 12.7
Russiaa 1.8 2.3 Francea 9.4 9.1 20.6
Vietnama 1.4 2.0 Adriatice,a 4.1 7.7 8.7
Indiaa −1.5 1.7 Chinab −55.7 −1.6 60.1
Global
exports
127.8 71.9 Global exports 271.0 168.0 291.9
a becomes major exporter when climate extreme occurs
b become major exporter when climate extreme occurs under MIR-2050-A1-EW only
c no longer major exporter when climate extreme occurs in 2050 under climate change
d region includes Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia
e region includes Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Montenegro, Serbia, and Macedonia
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region would even become net maize exporters. Under the ‘Base-
2012’ scenario, the leading maize exporters globally in 2012 would
be the USA and Argentina. These two countries would account for
80% of global maize exports in 2012, with the USA alone account-
ing for 72% of global maize exports. With the climate extreme, the
USA would become the fourth leading maize exporter by account-
ing for 8% of global maize exports. India and Brazil, two countries
that would have been net maize importers under the ‘Base-2012’
scenario, would join the list of leading maize exporters. Vietnam
would be the only country from E & SE Asia to join the list of major
maize exporters (Table 2).
The decrease in global maize production means that global
maize consumption would also have to decrease. E & SE Asia
would experience the largest decrease in maize consumption in
volume terms. However, Africa would experience the largest
relative decrease. More speciﬁcally, maize consumption in SSA
would decrease by 9% compared to the ‘Base-2012’ scenario.
By contrast, E & SE Asia would experience a decrease of 7%
(Table 3). The bulk of the reduction in maize consumption would
relate to food in SSA. In all other regions of the developing world,
the bulk of the reduction in maize consumption would relate to
animal feed. The only exception would be South Asia where the
consumption of maize as food and feed would decrease by roughly
40% each (Table 3).
One indirect effect of the weather extreme consists of the
changes in the demand for maize substitutes and complements.
The negative impact of the climate extreme on global maize
production would lead to higher maize prices and hence would
incite consumers to substitute maize with other products. Another
indirect effect of the weather extreme consists of changes in the
production of other crops. Maize competes with other crops for
the allocation of land and other agricultural inputs. Hence, the
increased maize production recorded in countries not affected by
the climate extreme should affect the production of other agri-
cultural crops. These two indirect effects should lead to some
changes in the production and consumption of other major
cereals, namely rice and wheat; and other important staple foods,
including cassava in Sub-Saharan Africa. Overall, the production of
rice and wheat would increase globally by 2 million tons (Table 4).
Such increase reﬂects a global shift away from the consumption of
maize, which has become scarcer and hence more expensive,
towards the consumption of other major cereals. CWANA, South
Asia and E & SE Asia would increase their production of rice and
wheat by a small margin; In SSA and LAC, the production of wheat
and rice would be taxed by the increase in maize production
(Table 2) and hence would decrease slightly (Table 4). The
consumption of rice and wheat would substantially increase
everywhere except in South Asia where their consumption would
decrease by 89,000 tons compared to the ‘Base-2012’ scenario. In
all other regions of the developing world, the consumption of
wheat and rice would increase by 1.2 million tons (Table 4).
The importance of cassava in African diets is illustrated by the
fact that Sub-Saharan Africa would experience the highest increase
in cassava production and consumption after the weather extreme.
More speciﬁcally, the sub-region would account for 78% of the
increase of 457 thousand tons in world cassava production in 2012
under the ‘Base-2012-WE’ scenario (Table 4). The sub-region
would also increase its cassava consumption by 535 thousand
tonnes and would have to rely on imports to meet its consumption
requirements (Table 4).
The drop in global maize production coupled with some
adjustments in food consumption across the globe would lead to
world maize prices increasing by 17% in 2012 if the climate
extreme occurs under the baseline climate (Fig. 4). World prices
of wheat and rice would also increase, albeit slightly: about 1%,
each (Fig. 4).
Daily caloric intake derived from maize would decrease most in
SSA compared to other regions of the developing world when the
weather extreme affects the USA (Table 3). This, coupled with SSA
having the lowest average per capita caloric intake in 2012
(Table 3), suggests that consumers in SSA would ﬁnd it more
difﬁcult to substitute maize for other food products. Hence, the
Table 3
Projected impact of climate extreme on global maize consumption – results from IMPACT.
Food Feed Biofuels Other use Total Calorie - base Caloric change (food) Caloric change (maize)
Region Base-2012-EW vs Base-2012 in million tonnes (%) 2012 2012 2012
SSA −3.7 (−10) −0.4 (−5) 0.0 (0) −0.7 (−10) −4.8 (−9) 2,220.2 −35.3 −39.1
CWANA −0.5 (−4) −0.9 (−4) 0.0 (0) −0.1 (−4) −1.5 (−4) 2,776.6 −3.9 −5.7
South Asia −0.7 (−7) −0.6 (−7) 0.0 (0) −0.2 (−7) −1.5 (−7) 2,389.8 −4.8 −3.2
E & SE Asia −2.2 (−6) −14.0 (−8) 0.0 (0) −1.3 (−5) −17.5 (−7) 3,034.1 −9.5 −7.5
LAC −1.8 (−7) −3.6 (−5) 0.0 (0) −0.8 (−6) −6.2 (−6) 2,812.9 −28.1 −26.1
USA −0.3 (−6) −9.2 (−6) 0.0 (0) −2.1 (−6) −11.6 (−5) 3,687.6 −4.4 −6.1
ROW −0.3 (−5) −3.9 (−6) 0.0 (0) −0.8 (−6) −5.0 (−6) 3,287.0 −1.9 −2.7
Region CSI2050-B1-EW vs Base-2050 in million tonnes (%) 2050 2050 2050
SSA −11.3 (−15) −1.9 (−7) 0.0 (0) −2.0 (−15) −15.1 (−13) 2,650.5 −70.3 −54.1
CWANA −1.1 (−6) −3.3 (−6) 0.0 (0) −0.3 (−6) −4.7 (−6) 3,091.7 −24.9 −8.0
South Asia −1.3 (−10) −6.5 (−12) 0.0 (0) −0.4 (−9) −8.2 (−11) 2,649.0 −33.3 −4.8
E & SE Asia −3.7 (−9) −40.5 (−12) 0.0 (0) −1.9 (−7) −46.1 (−11) 3,560.0 −40.5 −12.0
LAC −3.1 (−10) −11.2 (−8) 0.0 (0) −1.3 (−9) −15.5 (−8) 3,044.5 −59.5 −35.0
USA −0.5 (−8) −18.0 (−9) 0.0 (0) −4.0 (−8) −22.4 (−6) 4,009.0 −20.3 −9.2
ROW −0.5 (−8) −6.9 (−9) 0.0 (0) −1.3 (−9) -8.6 (−8) 3,562.5 −23.2 −4.3
Region MIR2050−A1−EW vs Base-2050 in million tonnes (%) 2050 2050 2050
SSA −22.4 (−29) −3.7 (−14) 0.0 (0) −4.0 (−30) −30.1 (−26) 2,650.5 −108.0 −107.5
CWANA −2.4 (−14) −6.7 (−13) 0.0 (0) −0.6 (−12) −9.7 (−13) 3,091.7 −24.9 −17.3
South Asia −2.8 (−20) −13.2 (−24) 0.0 (0) −0.9 (−20) −16.8 (−23) 2,649.0 −32.0 −10.2
E & SE Asia −7.8 (−18) −79.6 (−24) 0.0 (0) −4.2 (−15) −91.7 (−23) 3,560.0 −58.8 −25.6
LAC −6.4 (−20) −22.1 (−16) 0.0 (0) −2.7 (−19) −31.2 (−17) 3,044.5 −121.8 −73.0
USA −1.0 (−17) −36.3 (−18) 0.0 (0) −8.3 (−17) −45.6 (−12) 4,009.0 −41.4 −19.3
ROW −0.9 (−16) −13.8 (−18) 0.0 (0) −2.7 (−18) −17.4 (−17) 3,562.5 −13.6 −9.0
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effects of the weather extreme on food security would likely be
worst in SSA. Another region that would experience a substantial
decrease in caloric intake from maize is the LAC region; however,
its average per capita daily caloric intake, under the ‘Base-2012’
scenario, would be much higher than that of SSA (Table 3).
The number of people at risk of hunger would increase most in
SSA, the region that would also experience the largest decrease in
per capita caloric availability due to the weather extreme. Within
SSA, countries that would experience an increase of 1 million or
more in the number of people at risk of hunger would mainly be
from Eastern Africa and would consist of Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia,
Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of Congo
(Fig. 5).
Despite experiencing larger reductions in per capita caloric
availability, Malawi would have a smaller increase in the number
of people at risk of hunger compared to Kenya and Tanzania
(Fig. 5). The higher population levels in Kenya and Tanzania would
explain this result. Kenya, Tanzania and Malawi would have similar
per capita caloric intake in 2012 under the ‘Base-2012’ scenario
with 2070, 2081 and 2018 calories, respectively. Hence, their
shares of people at risk of hunger would be similar: they would
stand at 30, 27 and 34 for Kenya, Tanzania and Malawi, respec-
tively. However, the population in each of Kenya and Tanzania
would be twice as high as that of Malawi. More speciﬁcally, Kenya,
Tanzania and Malawi would have about 43, 48 and 16 million
people, respectively. The combination of similar per capita caloric
intake across the 3 countries and a much smaller population in
Malawi implies that the weather extreme would lead to a smaller
increase in the number of at-risk people in Malawi, even if the
country experiences a larger reduction in caloric intake, compared
to Kenya and Tanzania. However, in relative terms, the effect of the
weather extreme would be more severe in Malawi compared to
Kenya or Tanzania. The relative increase in the number of people
at risk of hunger would be 24% in Malawi compared to the ‘Base-
2012’ scenario; it would stand at 19 and 17% in Kenya and
Tanzania, respectively. Relative values do away with the effect
that population levels can have on estimating the impact of the
weather extreme.
Ethiopia and Zambia would also have similar daily per capita
caloric intake in 2012, under the ‘Base-2012’ scenario; however,
the Ethiopian population would be 6 times higher than that of
Zambia. Hence, the weather extreme would lead to Ethiopia
having a higher increase in the number of people at risk of hunger
(Fig. 4), although its relative effect would be more severe in
Zambia which would experience a higher reduction in caloric
intake due to the weather extreme. In relative terms, the increase
in the number of people at risk of hunger would be 20% in Zambia
and 5% in Ethiopia.
Lesotho, which would experience the largest reduction in
caloric intake in SSA would also account for the largest relative
increase in the number of people at risk of hunger: 46%. Lesotho
would be followed by South Africa which would experience a
relative increase of 41% in the number of people at risk of hunger.
South Africa and Tanzania would have similar population sizes in
2012. They would also experience a similar reduction in per capita
caloric intake due to the weather extreme (Fig. 5). However, South
Africa would have a higher per capita caloric intake which would
ensure that a smaller portion of its population would be at risk of
hunger in 2012 under the ‘Base-2012’ scenario. The higher caloric
intake in South Africa would also dampen the negative effect of
the weather extreme on the number of people at risk of hunger
(Fig. 5). In relative terms, South Africa would experience a larger
increase in the number of people at risk of hunger compared to
Tanzania, due to its smaller population at risk of hunger under the
‘Base-2012’ scenario.
Table 4
Projected impact of the climate extreme on the production and consumption of
rice, wheat and cassava – results from IMPACT.
Base-2012-EW vs
Base-2012
CSI2050-B1-EW vs
Base-2050
MIR2050-A1-EW vs
Base-2050
Region Change in production of rice and wheat in thousand tons (%)
SSA −8.0 (−0.0) 732.8 (1.7) −975.2 (−2.2)
CWANA 149.9 (0.1) −6,018.3 (−3.6) 3,044.9 (1.8)
South
Asia
565.5 (0.3) −16,914.6 (−6.3) 8,746.3 (3.2)
E & SE
Asia
555.2 (0.2) −6,989.6 (−1.8) 17,529.2 (4.6)
LAC −6.0 (−0.0) −1,008.3 (−1.6) −4,266.8 (−6.6)
USA −16.2 (−0.0) 9,843.7 (10.4) −7,661.1 (−8.1)
ROW 747.3 (0.3) 9,877.1 (2.3) −2,362.4 (−0.6)
World 1,987.6 (0.2) −10,477.2 (−0.7) 14,055.0 (1.0)
Change in consumption of rice and wheat in thousand tons (%)
SSA 302.0 (0.8) −1,660.8 (−1.4) 2,721.6 (2.2)
CWANA 339.8 (0.2) −363.0 (−0.2) 3,520.7 (1.5)
South
Asia
−88.8 (−0.0) −4,033.0 (−1.4) −1,034.1 (−0.4)
E & SE
Asia
406.6 (0.1) −3,870.1 (−1.0) 1,874.3 (0.5)
LAC 176.4 (0.3) −365.4 (−0.6) 748.5 (1.2)
USA 246.9 (0.6) 28.4 (0.0) 1,764.0 (2.8)
ROW 604.8 (0.3) −213.3 (−0.1) 4,460.0 (1.7)
World 1,987.6 (0.2) −10,477.2 (−0.7) 14,055.0 (1.0)
Change in production of cassava in thousand tons (%)
SSA 356.3 (0.2) −2,049.6 (−0.8) 1,015.1 (0.4)
CWANA 1.7 (0.3) 7.6 (0.7) 13.5 (1.3)
South
Asia
25.4 (0.3) 46.8 (0.4) 531.3 (4.0)
E & SE
Asia
8.9 (0.0) −307.1 (−0.5) 1,380.6 (2.2)
LAC 64.5 (0.2) 1,144.9 (2.1) −2,152.5 (−3.9)
USA 0.0 (−0.0) 0.0 (0.2) −0.8 (−9.9)
ROW 0.4 (0.1) 147.3 (23.0) 271.0 (42.4)
World 457.1 (0.2) −1,010.1 (−0.3) 1,058.3 (0.3)
Change in consumption of cassava in thousand tons (%)
SSA 535.2 (0.4) −180.3 (−0.1) 2,074.8 (0.8)
CWANA 2.0 (0.1) −14.5 (−0.6) −4.0 (−0.2)
South
Asia
−15.3 (−0.2) −69.0 (−0.7) −110.5 (−1.1)
E & SE
Asia
14.3 (0.0) −74.4 (−0.1) −38.1 (−0.1)
LAC −88.8 (−0.2) −615.8 (−1.3) −827.1 (−1.7)
USA 0.2 (0.1) −1.7 (−0.7) −2.2 (−0.9)
ROW 9.5 (0.1) −54.2 (−0.8) −34.7 (−0.5)
World 457.1 (0.2) −1,010.1 (−0.3) 1,058.3 (0.3)
Fig. 4. Projected impact of the climate extreme on key cereal prices.
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The LAC region, which would experience the second largest
decrease in per capita caloric availability due to the weather
extreme, would see an increase of 2.6 million in the number of
people at risk of hunger. Within the LAC region, countries from the
Caribbean and Central America (CCA) would be hardest-hit,
despite experiencing a smaller decrease in per capita caloric intake
compared to Mexico (Fig. 5). In 2012, prior to the weather extreme,
Mexico would have a higher daily per capita caloric intake
compared to CCA; the caloric intake levels would stand at 3124
and 2458 in Mexico and CCA, respectively. Hence, CCA would have
a higher share of its population at risk of hunger: 21% in CCA
versus 5% in Mexico. These would correspond to 16 million people
at risk of hunger in CCA versus 5.8 million in Mexico whose
population would be 1.5 times higher than that of CCA in 2012.
The weather extreme would lead to a higher reduction in caloric
intake in Mexico; however, its effect of food security would not be
worse in Mexico compared to CCA, because of the less precarious
food security situation in Mexico, prior to the weather extreme.
In relative terms, the increase in the number of people at risk of
hunger caused by the weather extreme would be higher in CCA
compared to Mexico: 5.8 versus 4.8%.
Across the LAC region, few other countries CSA, NSA, Chile,
Uruguay, and Colombia would experience a higher relative
increase in the number of people at risk of hunger compared to
CCA (Fig. 5). CSA and NSA would have the highest relative increase
in the number of people at risk of hunger with a value of 8.5%,
each. Chile, Uruguay, and Columbia would follow with increases of
7.2%, 7%, and 6%, respectively.
In the CSA and NSA regions, caloric intake in 2012 prior to the
weather extreme would be smaller than that of CCA. The decrease
in food caloric intake brought by the weather extreme in the CSA
and NSA regions would be similar to that of the CCA region. Hence,
the proportional increase in the number of people at risk of
hunger would be lower in CCA compared to CSA and NSA.
Chile, Colombia and Uruguay would have a higher caloric
intake compared to CCA prior to the weather extreme. Hence,
compared to the CCA region, these three countries would have a
smaller proportion of their population that would be at risk of
hunger prior to the weather extreme. In addition, each of Chile,
Colombia and Uruguay would have a much smaller population
compared to the CCA region. Hence, the proportional increase in
the number of people at risk of hunger due to the weather extreme
would be higher in these three countries compared to CCA.
Interestingly, South Asia, where the reduction in caloric
intake would be less than one-sixth of that of SSA, would be the
second hardest-hit region in terms of food insecurity; the number
of people at risk of hunger in this region would increase by
3 million due to the weather extreme. India alone would account
for more than two-thirds of the increase in the number of at-risk
people in South Asia, despite experiencing a reduction in caloric
intake that would be substantially less than that of Nepal or
Bhutan (Fig. 5).
Fig. 5. Projected impact of extreme weather event on number of people at risk of hunger in 2012 – results from IMPACT. CCA region includes Belize, Costa Rica, Cuba,
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama; CSA includes Bolivia and Paraguay; NSA includes French Guiana, Guyana, Suriname
and Venezuela. (a) World, (b) SSA, (c) south asia and (d) LAC.
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The very high population in India explains why the increase in
the number of people at risk of hunger would be much higher in
value terms compared to Nepal or Bhutan. By 2012, India's
population would stand at around 1.2 billion; in Nepal and Bhutan,
the population numbers would stand at 31 million and 749
thousand, respectively. Prior to the weather extreme, daily per
capita caloric intake would be higher in India than in Nepal and
Bhutan. The values would be 2423, 2296 and 2229 in India, Nepal
and Bhutan, respectively. Hence, the share of the population at risk
of hunger would be lower in India; these shares would be 17%, 18%
and 28% in India, Nepal and Bhutan, respectively. In relative terms,
the impact of the weather extreme on the number of people at risk
of hunger would be slightly higher in Nepal than in Bhutan: 8%
and 6%, respectively. By contrast, India would experience a 1%
increase in the number of people at risk of hunger due to the
weather extreme. Apart from Bhutan and Nepal, Bangladesh
would also have a higher relative increase in the number of people
at risk of hunger compared to India.
Surprisingly, despite experiencing the largest reduction in
maize consumption across the developing world (Table 3), E &
SE Asia would not experience a substantial reduction in caloric
intake compared to SSA and the LAC region (Fig. 5). This is mainly
caused by the fact the bulk of the reduction in maize consumption
in E & SE Asia would consist of a reduction in animal feed. In
addition, the region would have the highest base caloric intake in
2012 without the weather extreme, among all developing regions
(Table 3). Hence, E & SE Asia would experience the fourth largest
increase in the number of people at risk of hunger, in both value
and relative terms. The region would be ranking behind SSA, LAC
and South Asia.
3.2. Results – impact of a 2050 weather extreme on global food
security
Under the ‘Base-2050’ scenario, the world economies are
projected to experience moderate growth in per capita income
between 2000 and 2050. Under such scenario, countries which
were ranked as developing countries in 2012 might no longer be
considered as such in 2050. Hence, in this section, they are
referred as developing countries/regions of 2012.
Under the ‘Base-2050’ scenario, global maize production would
almost double by 2050 compared to 2012. Just like in the 2000s
and 2010s, the USA would remain the leading maize producer and
exporter in the world in 2050: the country would account for 40%
and 64% of global maize production and exports, respectively
(Table 2). Hence, an extreme weather event that would affect
maize production in the USA in 2050 could still have serious
repercussions for food security in vulnerable regions.
If the weather extreme occurs in 2050 instead of 2012, its
effects on maize production in the USA would be more pro-
nounced. More speciﬁcally, the reduction in maize production
caused by the weather extreme would range between 37% under
the ‘CSI2050-B1-EW’ climate scenario and 76% under the
‘MIR2050-A1-EW’ climate scenario. However, maize consumption
in the USA would barely decrease. In this case, the country would
have to become a net maize importer to meet its consumption
requirements: its net maize imports would range between 4.6 and
19 million tons (Fig. 3).
The substantial decrease in maize production in the USA in
2050 coupled with sustained maize consumption within the
country would translate into high maize prices that would incite
other countries not affected by the climate extreme, to increase
their maize production (Table 2). Maize production would increase
everywhere, except in the CWANA region (Table 2) where maize
would still not be a key food product in 2050 (Table 3). However,
despite the increased maize production in countries not affected
by the climate extreme, global maize production would still
decrease by 9% to 18%, compared to the ‘Base-2050’ scenario.
By 2050, under the ‘base-2050’ scenario, the USA, Argentina,
Brazil and Central Europe would lead global maize exports and
would account together for 80% of global maize exports. However,
the weather extreme would force the USA out of the list of the
major maize exporters in 2050; other countries that would
become major maize exporters globally would mainly come from
the European continent (Table 2).
The weather extreme in 2050 would reduce global maize
consumption. E & SE Asia would experience by far the largest
reduction in maize consumption in volume terms (Table 3). In
addition, the reduction in maize consumption in this region would
mainly affect animal feed. SSA and the LAC region would be next,
relative to the reduction in maize consumption. In each of these
regions, maize consumption would decrease by 15–30 million
tonnes due to the weather extreme. In SSA, the bulk of the
reduction would relate to human food whereas in the LAC region,
it would relate to animal feed (Table 3).
If the weather extreme occurs in 2050 under the milder climate
change scenario, the decrease in global maize production would be
accompanied by a decrease in the production of wheat and rice.
This implies that the increased demand for rice and wheat brought
by the weather extreme would not be strong enough to increase
the production of these two commodities. Overall, the consump-
tion of rice and wheat would decrease across all world regions,
except the USA, where it would remain stagnant (Table 4).
Similarly, the production of rice and wheat would decrease across
most regions of the developing world of 2012, except in SSA,
which would experience an increase in the production of maize,
rice and wheat under the weather extreme (Table 4). In South Asia,
E & SE Asia and LAC, the increase in maize production brought by
the weather extreme would be accompanied by a decrease in the
production of rice and wheat (Table 4).
The weather extreme would see SSA increase its production of
key cereals in 2050 under the milder climate change scenario. This
increase would come at the expense of reducing the production of
other crops, including cassava. More speciﬁcally, the sub-continent
would lead all regions relative to the reduction in cassava
production (Table 4). SSA would also experience the second-
largest reduction in cassava consumption if the weather extreme
occurs in 2050 under the milder climate change scenario (Table 4).
The LAC region would experience the largest increase in cassava
production and the largest reduction in cassava consumption if the
weather extreme occurs under the milder climate change scenario
(Table 4). Since the region was a net cassava exporter prior to the
weather extreme (data not shown), the change in its cassava
production and consumption would be used as exports to other
regions.
If the weather extreme occurs in 2050 under the harsher
climate change scenario, the decrease in global maize production
would be accompanied by an increase in the global consumption
of rice and wheat (Table 4). In addition, the changes in the
production and consumption of rice and wheat across the devel-
oping world would be similar to those that would occur, if the
weather extreme occurred in 2012.
If the weather extreme occurs under the harsher climate
change scenario, SSA would increase its consumption of not only
rice and wheat, but also cassava. The sub-continent would increase
its cassava consumption by more than 2 million tons; it would also
be the only region that would experience an increase in cassava
consumption due to the weather extreme (Table 4). Cassava
production would also increase in the SSA (Table 4), but the sub-
continent would still need to rely on imports to meet its con-
sumption requirements. In the LAC region, the increase of 42
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million tons in maize production would come at the cost of
reducing the production of other crops, including rice, wheat
and cassava. Cassava production would decrease by more than
2 million tons whereas the production of combined rice and wheat
would decrease by 7.6 million tons (Table 4).
If the climate extreme occurs in 2050 under climate change,
maize prices in the long run would increase by 30% to 70%,
compared to the ‘Base-2050’ scenario (Fig. 4). Long-run prices
for wheat would increase from 1% to 3% whereas long run prices
for rice would increase from 8% to 9% (Fig. 4). Interestingly, the
prices of rice and wheat would be higher if the weather extreme
occurred under the milder climate change scenario compared to
the harsher climate change scenario. The higher prices, related to
the milder climate change scenario, are partly fuelled by the
decrease in the global production of rice and wheat when the
weather extreme occurs under the milder climate change scenario
(Table 4).
Despite experiencing the largest reduction in maize consump-
tion under the weather extreme, E & SE Asia would rank below
SSA, South Asia and the LAC region, in the number of people at risk
of hunger (Figs. 6 and 7). The combination of the highest base
caloric intake in 2050 and relatively small reductions in caloric
intake due to the weather extreme in E & SE Asia would explain
this result. The reduction in maize consumption in E & SE Asia
would mainly consist of a reduction in animal feed (Table 3). This
would translate into a smaller reduction in caloric intake com-
pared to other regions such as SSA where the bulk of the reduction
in maize consumption would consist of a reduction in food
(Table 3).
SSA would experience the largest increase in the number of
people at risk of hunger, if the weather extreme occurs in 2050
under climate change (Figs. 6 and 7). The region would be unique
in combining one of the lowest caloric intakes by 2050 with one of
the highest reductions in caloric intake due to the weather
extreme (Table 3). The increase in the number of people at risk
of hunger in SSA would range between 36 and 66 million people.
In relative terms, the number of people at risk of hunger in SSA
would rise by 14% to 26% compared to the ‘Base-2050’ scenario.
If the weather extreme occurs under the milder climate change
scenario, the countries within SSA that would experience an
increase of 1 million or more in the number of people at risk of
hunger are Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Nigeria
(Fig. 6); most of them would be in East Africa. However, if the
weather extreme occurs under the harsher climate change sce-
nario, more countries would experience an increase of at least
1 million in the number of people at risk of hunger. Additional
countries that would join the countries listed above are Angola in
Central Africa; and Benin and Togo in West Africa (Fig. 7).
In relative terms, the countries in SSA that would experience
the largest increases in the number of people at risk of hunger
under the weather extreme would also be located in eastern
Africa. If the weather extreme occurs under the milder climate
change scenario, countries with the largest relative increase in the
Fig. 6. Projected impact of the extreme weather event on number of people at risk of hunger under the CSI2050 A1 EW scenario – results from IMPACT. CCA region includes
Belize, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama; CSA includes Bolivia and Paraguay; NSA includes French
Guiana, Guyana, Suriname and Venezuela. (a) World, (b) SSA, (c) south asia and (d) LAC.
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number of people at risk of hunger would be Gambia in West
Africa with an increase of 163% and Lesotho in southern Africa
with an increase of 68%. These two countries would be followed by
Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe
with 59%, 45%, 36%, 34%, 29%, and 23%, respectively. If the weather
extreme occurs under the harsher climate change scenario, Togo in
West Africa would experience the highest relative increase with
305%; it would be followed by Gambia in West Africa with 163%,
Lesotho in southern Africa with 148%. Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia,
Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe would follow with an
increase of 146%, 82%, 76%, 68%, 52% and 47%, respectively.
In southern Africa, only Lesotho would experience an increase
in the number of people at risk of hunger, if the weather extreme
occurs in 2050 under climate change (Figs. 5 and 6). More
speciﬁcally, the number of people at risk of hunger would rise
by 200 thousand under the milder climate change scenario to 421
thousand under the harsher climate change scenario (Fig. 6). If the
weather extreme occurs under the milder climate change scenario
(CSI2050-A1-EW), daily caloric intake would decrease by 112, 93,
86 and 77, in Swaziland, South Africa, Botswana and Namibia,
respectively (Fig. 6). The reductions in caloric intake would be
larger under the harsher climate change scenario. However, none
of these countries would experience an increase in the number of
at-risk people (Figs. 6 and 7). This implies that by 2050, daily
caloric intake in all of southern Africa, Lesotho excluded, would
have risen enough to offset the negative effect of the weather
extreme on national food security.
In Central Africa, 3 countries, namely Cameroon, Equatorial
Guinea and Gabon, would experience no increase in the number of
people at risk of hunger is the weather extreme occurs under the
milder climate change scenario (Fig. 6). Among these three
countries, Cameroon would experience the largest decrease in
caloric intake whereas Equatorial Guinea would experience the
lowest decrease. In these three countries too, average per capita
caloric intake would have risen enough by 2050 to counter the
negative effects of the weather extreme on national food security.
Among all 3 countries, oil-producing Gabon would be the richest
by 2050 with a per capita income that would be 4 times higher
than that of Equatorial Guinea and 7 times higher than that of
Cameroon. Gabon would also be having the highest caloric intake
prior to the weather extreme: 3411 calories per capita. If the
weather extreme occurred in 2050 under the harsher climate
change scenario, the same three countries would see no increase
in their number of people at risk of hunger (Fig. 7). In all other
countries in Central Africa, the weather extreme would worsen
national food security under any of the climate change scenarios.
These countries are Angola, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo
and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Moreover, in all these
countries, except Congo, the reduction in caloric intake brought by
the weather extreme would be higher under the harsher climate
change scenario compared to the milder scenario (Figs. 6 and 7).
In half of all western African countries, food security would not
worsen if the climate extreme occurs in 2050 under the milder
climate change scenario. These countries include Ghana, Guinea,
Fig. 7. Projected impact of the extreme weather event on number of people at risk of hunger under the MIR2050 B1 EW scenario – results from IMPACT. CCA region includes
Belize, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama; CSA includes Bolivia and Paraguay; NSA includes French
Guiana, Guyana, Suriname and Venezuela. (a) World, (b) SSA, (c) south asia and (d) LAC.
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Guinea Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. Benin
would experience the second largest increase in the number of
people at risk of hunger in West Africa. The country would
experience an increase of 700,000 people and it would be
followed by Niger with 360,000, Gambia with 260,000 and
Burkina Faso with 240,000 (Fig. 7).
Apart from Togo, all other countries in West Africa that did not
experience an increase in the number of people at risk of hunger
under the milder climate change would have the same outcome
under the harsher climate change scenario (Fig. 7). In Togo, the
reduction in caloric intake would rise from 127 under the milder
climate change scenario to 200 under the harsher climate change
scenario. As a result, the number of people at risk of hunger would
rise from 0 under the milder scenario to 1.4 million under the
harsher scenario. In Benin, Burkina Faso and Nigeria, the increase
in number of people at risk of hunger would be worse if the
weather extreme occurs under the harsher climate change sce-
nario compared to the milder scenario. More speciﬁcally, under
the harsher climate change scenario, the number of people at risk
of hunger would rise to 1 million, 360,000 and 1.8 million in Benin,
Burkina Faso and Nigeria, respectively (Fig. 7). In the other
countries, namely Gambia, Liberia and Niger, the increase in the
number of people at risk of hunger would be smaller if the
weather extreme occurs under the harsher climate change sce-
nario compared to the milder scenario. In Gambia and Niger, under
the harsher climate change scenario, the number of people at risk
of hunger would rise to 260,000 and 4000 people, respectively; it
would decrease by 31,000 people in Liberia (Fig. 7).
Within the LAC region, the number of people at risk of hunger
would rise from 5 million under the milder climate change
scenario to 11 million under the harsher climate change scenario
(Figs. 6 and 7). This result suggests that, as the momentum of
climate change worsens, the negative effect of the weather
extreme on food security in the LAC region would also worsen.
Within the LAC region, the Caribbean Central America and
Mexico would be hardest-hit: the number of people at risk of
hunger would increase by 2–4 million in CCA and by 1.4–2.5
million in Mexico (Figs. 6 and 7). In relative terms, CCA would
experience an increase of 13–28% in the number of people at risk
of hunger compared to the ‘Base-2050’ scenario. In Mexico, the
change in the number of people at risk of hunger would range
from 25% to 43%. The higher at-risk population in CCA, under the
‘Base-2050’ scenario, explains why the weather extreme would
lead to a higher increase in the number of people at risk of hunger,
despite CCA experiencing smaller reductions in per capita caloric
intake compared to Mexico.
By 2050, under the ‘Base-2050’ scenario, Mexico would have a
substantially higher daily per capita caloric intake compared to
CCA, even if the latter would have seen an improvement in food
security between 2012 and 2050. Indeed, average per capita daily
caloric intake under the baseline climate model would be 2700 by
the year 2050, compared to 2460 in the year 2012 for the CCA.
In Mexico, per capita caloric intake would remain high by 2050
and would barely change between 2012 and 2050; it would
increase from 3100 to 3200. By 2050, Mexico would also have a
slightly larger population compared to CCA, under the baseline
climate model: 144 versus 109 million people. The substantially
higher caloric intake in Mexico coupled with a slightly higher
population leads to Mexico having a lower at-risk population
compared to CCA by 2050, under the baseline climate model.
Indeed, by 2050, under the ‘Base-2050’ scenario, the number of
people at risk of hunger would reach 14 million in CCA; it would
reach 5.8 million in Mexico.
In other regions not as populous as CCA, the relative increase in
the number of people at risk of hunger would be very high, despite
these regions experiencing reductions in caloric intake similar to
those of CCA and also sharing similar per capita caloric intake in
2050 under the ‘Base-2050’ scenario. NSA and CCA would share
similar daily per capita caloric intake by 2050, under the ‘Base-
2050’ scenario: 2700. Moreover, the reductions in caloric intake
caused by the weather extreme would be similar across the two
regions (Figs. 6 and 7). Yet, CCA would experience a higher
increase in the number of people at risk of hunger (Figs. 6 and
7). However, the relative increase in the number of people at risk
of hunger in NSA would range between 34% and 80% and hence,
would be much higher than that of CCA. The higher population in
CCA explains this result: by 2050, the population would be 44
million in NSA compared to 108 million in CCA.
South Asia would also be the second hardest-hit region after
SSA, if the weather extreme occurred in 2050, instead of 2012: the
number of people at risk of hunger would rise by 17 million people
(Figs. 6 and 7). The largest increase in the number of people at risk
of hunger would occur in India. Interestingly, the reduction in
caloric intake in India would be less than half that of Nepal and
yet, India would experience an increase of 10–11 million in the
number of at-risk people, unlike Nepal which would experience an
increase of 1.1–1.6 million (Figs. 6 and 7). The higher population in
India explains these results. The two countries would have similar
average per capita caloric intake by 2050, under the ‘Base-2050’
scenario. In India, daily caloric intake would stand at 2700; in
Nepal, it would stand at 2500. However, India's population would
reach 1.7 billion by 2050, whereas Nepal's population would reach
46 million. In relative terms, the increase in the number of at-risk
people in India would range between 8% and 7% compared to a
scenario involving perfect climate change. In Nepal, the increase
would range between 28 and 41%.
4. Discussion
USDA's estimates are in agreement with the simulated results
on annual maize production and consumption in the USA in 2012,
after the weather extreme. Based on USDA's estimates, annual
maize production in the USA was estimated at 314 million tons in
the 2011/12 season; world maize production stood at around 881
million tons over the same period (Foreign Agricultural Service,
2012). Hence, the share of the USA in global maize production was
around 36%. Based on the simulated results from IMPACT, the
projected share of the USA in global maize production after the
weather extreme in 2012 would be 32%. The simulated results
from IMPACT imply that US maize production in 2012, after the
weather extreme, would be about 238 million tons and world
maize production would stand at 741 million tons.
Similarly, the estimates from USDA suggest that, with a con-
sumption volume of 279 million tons in 2012, the USA accounted
for 32% of global maize consumption (Foreign Agricultural Service,
2012). The simulated results from IMPACT imply that, with
the weather extreme in 2012, US maize consumption would stand
at 244 million and would account for 33% of global maize
consumption.
However, the estimates from USDA differ substantially from
those of IMPACT on maize trade volumes. The simulated results
from IMPACT imply that, with net maize exports amounting to
8 million tons under the weather extreme in 2012, the US would
account for 11% of world maize exports. By contrast, USDA's
estimates imply that net maize exports in the USA amounted to
14 million tons and the country accounted for 20% of global maize
exports in 2012 (Foreign Agricultural Service, 2012). In addition,
maize exports from the USA were much lower in 2012 than in
earlier years (Chung et al., submitted for publication); they were
also accompanied by a substantial decrease in US maize stocks,
compared to earlier years (Chung et al., submitted for publication).
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The simulated results from IMPACT imply that the change in US
maize stocks remains the same over the years, with or without the
weather extreme. Such discrepancy between USDA's estimates
and the simulated results from IMPACT reﬂect the limitations of
IMPACT, a partial equilibrium model that assumes that changes in
population, income and food stocks are exogenous. The projected
substantial decrease in net maize exports from the USAwould lead
to substantial but unrealistic effects on food security across the
globe. Hence, the magnitude of the results from IMPACT should be
used with caution; however, the trends observed in the results are
likely to be valid.
The study results demonstrate that climate extremes that
negatively affect crop production among major world exporters
can indeed have negative effects on food security in other regions.
The study results imply that across the developing world, Sub-
Saharan Africa, South Asia and the LAC region are likely to suffer
most from the climate extreme that occurred in the USA, in 2012.
Within SSA, the countries that would experience the highest
increase in the number of people at risk of hunger due to the
weather extreme would mainly be from eastern Africa; however,
the countries that would experience the highest relative increase
in the number of at-risk people would include countries from
eastern and southern Africa; these countries, which would experi-
ence an increase of 10% or more in the number of at-risk people,
would be Lesotho, South Africa, Malawi, Zambia, Kenya, Tanzania,
Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Uganda and Bostwana. Within the LAC
region, the CCA would experience the largest increase in the
number of people at risk of hunger due to the weather extreme;
however, in relative terms, CSA, NSA, Chile, Uruguay and Colombia,
would also see their food security worsen due to the weather
extreme. Within South Asia, India alone would account for two-
thirds of the increase in the number of people at risk of hunger.
Other countries that would experience substantial increases in
their number of at-risk people include Nepal and Bhutan.
The relative effects of the weather extreme on long-run maize
production would be worse if it occurred in 2050 instead of 2012.
The negative impact of the weather extreme on maize production
in the USA and hence on global maize production would be much
worse in 2050 than in 2012. With the non-implementation of
climate change adaptation strategies across the world food baskets
between the 2000s and 2050s, climate change would be eroding
crop productivity gains over the years. Hence, the weather
extreme in 2050 would further weaken maize productivity in
the USA, which is projected to remain the leading maize producer
and exporter in 2050.
Similarly, the negative effects of the weather extreme on food
security would be worse if it occurred in 2050 compared to 2012.
Globally, the relative increase in the number of people at risk of
hunger would be 1.4% in 2012; if the weather extreme occurred
in 2050, the relative increase in the number of at-risk people
would range between 8% and 13%. However, the hardest-hit
regions would remain the same, whether the weather extreme
occurs in 2012 instead of 2050: SSA, South Asia and the LAC
region. Across these regions, food security would improve
between 2012 and 2050, under the baseline climate model and
moderate growth in per capita income across world economies.
In few countries located in southern, western and central Africa,
and in the LAC region, per capita caloric intake would have risen
enough to offset the negative effects of the weather extreme.
However, in the other countries of SSA, South Asia and the LAC
region, the weather extreme would erode much of the gains
made in food security.
The effect of the weather extreme on food security in vulner-
able countries can be mitigated through social protection pro-
grams including cash transfers and food aid (Chung et al.,
submitted for publication). By 2012, the LAC region had strong
social protection programs (Ferreira and Robalino, 2010) which
likely mitigated the negative effect of the weather extreme on food
security in the region. Another strategy for enhancing the adaptive
capacity of countries to weather extremes would consist of
changing policies that favour the use of maize or other food crops
for biofuel production. The proportion of US maize production
used for ethanol production increased from 1% in the 1980s to 25%
in 2007/2008 (Piesse and Thirtle, 2009; Capehart, 2014). The
increase was fuelled in part by favourable US policies (Yano
et al., 2010; Capehart, 2014). Some of the maize used in ethanol
production could be diverted into replenishing US maize stocks
which could be used to buffer the production loss brought by
weather extremes.
Our results illustrate the considerable utility of the process-
based spatial bio-economic framework, as a tool for assessing the
impacts of extreme weather events. The socio-economic model
(IMPACT) is calibrated for the year 2000 and assumes moderate
growth in per capita income followed by the 2012 weather
extreme. The results from the model were close to the reality
despite the fact that it is unlikely that moderate economic growth
was observed across the whole world between 2000 and 2012.
Two major events, the global food price crisis in 2008 which was
followed by the global ﬁnancial crisis, were not captured in model.
These events had large inﬂuence on global food prices and farm-
ers' decisions. Similarly, speculation was not captured in model.
5. Conclusion
One of the objectives of this study was to quantify the potential
effects of the 2012 weather extreme in the USA on food security
across the developing world. Study results suggests that the
extreme climate of 2012 that occurred in the USA is likely to
increase food insecurity among poor communities where maize
provides a substantial portion of daily caloric intake and where
households cannot easily adjust their food consumption patterns
in the face of increased maize scarcity. Our results indicate that
countries where food security would worsen due to the weather
extreme are located in eastern and southern Africa; South Asia;
and the LAC region.
If a similar weather extreme were to occur in the USA in 2050
under climate change, its effects on global food production and
security would be worse, assuming no adaptation to climate
change over the years. In addition, the hardest-hit regions would
remain the same, whether the weather extreme occurs in 2012
instead of 2050: SSA, South Asia and the LAC region. However, for
few countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and LAC, per capita caloric
intake would have risen enough to completely offset the negative
effect of the weather extreme on food insecurity.
Future research would involve developing a CGE model that
can consider the spillover effects of weather extremes. Similarly,
frequency distribution on weather extremes could be used in
combination with a CGE model to project the impact of climate
extremes in the future.
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